17th Matching in Practice Workshop in St. Petersburg

May 10-11, 2021

Venue: 3A Kantemirovskaya st., St. Petersburg, Russia

& Zoom (worldwide)

Program

Day 1

May, 10 (Room 339)

CES Time (corresponds to PDT+11, EDT+6, MSK-1)

11:00 – 11:50 Registration

11:50 – 12:00 Welcoming address

12:00 – 13:15 Session 1

Marek Pycia (University of Zurich): *A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design*

Christian Basteck (WZB Berlin Social Science Center): *Strategy-Proof and Envyfree Random Assignment*

Alexander Nesterov (HSE University): *Incentives in Matching Markets: Counting and Comparing the Number of Manipulating Agents*

13:15 – 13:30 Coffee Break

13:30 – 14:45 Session 2

Tomás Larroucau (University of Pennsylvania): *Dynamic College Admissions and the Determinants of Students' College Retention*

Rustamdjan Hakimov (University of Lausanne): *Costly Information Acquisition in Centralized Matching Markets*

Jonathan Davis (University of Oregon): *Labor Market Design Can Improve Match Outcomes: Evidence from Matching Teach For America Teachers to Schools*

14:45 – 15:15 Lunch

15:15 – 16:05 Session 3

Ashutosh Thakur (Graduate School of Business Stanford University): *Combining Social Choice and Matching Theory to Understand Institutional Stability*

Nick Arnosti (Columbia University): *Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation*

16:05 – 16:20 Coffee Break

16:20 – 18:00 Policy Table

Centralized job market for Economists

Andrew Johnston (University of California at Merced), **Itai Ashlagi** (Stanford University), **Laura Doval** (Columbia Business School), **Alex Teytelboym** (University of Oxford), and **Dorothea Kübler** (WZB Berlin Social Science Center)

Day 2

May, 11 (Room 339)

12:00 – 13:15 Session 1

Antonio Miralles (University of Messina and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics): *Fairness and Efficiency for Allocations with Participation Constraints*

Flip Klijn (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics): *Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange*

Juan Pereyra (University of the Republic): *Optimal Assignment Mechanisms with Imperfect Verification*

13:15 – 13:30 Coffee Break

13:30 – 14:20 Session 2

Renke Schmacker (University of Lausanne): *Fairness in Matching Markets: Experimental Evidence*

Bobby Pakzad-Hurson (Brown University): *Do Peer Preferences Matter in School Choice Market Design? Theory and Evidence*

14:20 – 14:50 Lunch

14:50 – 16:05 Session 3

David Delacretaz (University of Oxford): *Processing Reserves Simultaneously*

Bertan Turhan (Iowa State University): *How to De-Reserve Reserves*

Juan Escobar (University of Chile): *School choice and segregation*

16:05 – 16:20 Coffee Break

16:20 – 17:20 Keynote Talk

Utku Ünver (Boston College): *TBA*